THE SPONSORSHIP AND FINANCING OF LIVINGSTONE'S LAST JOURNEY

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David Livingstone's last venture in Africa lasted from 1866 to 1873. It fascinated contemporary observers and has since called forth numerous studies by biographers and historians, because so many elements seem involved: the epic of one man's struggle to fulfil his destiny, the culmination of the exploration of the "dark continent," the beginnings of serious missionary enterprise in East and Central Africa, the campaign against the slave trade, and, perhaps, the beginnings of imperialism. Given this multiplicity of factors, it has proved difficult enough to place Livingstone's journey in a convincing context of his whole life. Was he, for example, a "mystic in search of a visionary goal" or simply a geographical explorer?\(^1\) To set the journey and Livingstone's death in a wider context of European activities in Africa is even more difficult although many attempts have been made.\(^2\) In the future there will need to be greater emphasis on the place of the journey in African history. Provisionally, it can be suggested that the extremely modest strength of his party meant that he had a smaller direct impact on the immediate situation than other contemporary explorers like, say, Burton, Speke, or especially Stanley, who all had larger and better armed caravans. Yet the less tangible and less direct impact of Livingstone is generally held to have been more important for Africans in the long run. The position may be summed up by saying that Livingstone believed that there was nothing to justify the idea that Africans were inferior and unfitted to become full members of the civilized human family. While it is true that he may have "left some traces of these

2. Jack Simmons, Livingstone and Africa (London, 1955), is a good indication of the factors which are normally discussed. The standard study of the last journey is R. Coupland, Livingstone's Last Journey (London, 1945).
sentiments" among the people he met on his travels, it is the inspiration Livingstone gave to the working out of this assumption after his death by both Europeans and Africans that has wrought the greatest changes in the continent. For this reason the last journey will continue to attract the attention of historians. The way it was financed and sponsored is one aspect of Livingstone's career that has been misunderstood; this paper offers some observations on the subject.

Three principal considerations are involved in discussing the inception of the journey: the place of the British government and its somewhat equivocal relationship with the explorer; the role of the Royal Geographical Society, with which his connection was equally equivocal; and the aims of Livingstone himself. In addition, but more difficult to define, there is Livingstone's relationship with a circle of friends, acquaintances, and various organizations, which widened out to become a general public which regarded him as their popular hero. Having been taught by Livingstone to see Africa in moral terms, they often reacted accordingly.

As later events proved, public opinion could be strong enough to ensure that Livingstone was given consideration by the British government. But during 1864-1865 more limited pressure groups ensured that the explorer could return to Africa avowedly as the representative of the government; it was perhaps Livingstone's own modest inclinations as much as anything which meant that he became an official in not much more than name. Yet the government would have given more than they did in 1865 only with considerable reluctance, for Livingstone was undoubtedly a source of embarrassment to them.

In general, official opinion was alarmed by the possibility of Britain's incurring new and costly responsibilities in East and Central Africa as a result of the activities of the man who was so proud of wearing his consular uniform. Indeed, the possibility of cutting down commitments in the continent was currently being investigated. Shortly before he left Britain, Livingstone gave evidence before the Select Committee on West African Settlements, which recommended the end of any "forwar" policy. No doubt he raised a mild scare by reporting that he had heard of a scheme by which English capitalists would take over Portugal's East African possessions for twenty years. This idea must have

4. H. A. C. Cairns, Prelude to Imperialism (London, 1965), 8; but see also R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians (London, 1961), 24, who suggest that figures like Livingstone were only "heroes of the hour."
been inspired by Livingstone, who made it quite clear that he thought British controlled settlements at certain points were a great necessity if the continent was to be improved. He added that the government ought to promote and assist lawful traders on the east coast as they had on the west coast. Such a suggestion seemed quite outside the bounds of possibility in 1865; the British government had quite as much an influence as it needed in East Africa for strategic or other purposes since it enjoyed "informal paramounty" over Zanzibar, where the French threat had been contained by the joint declaration of neutrality only three years before.

The government's campaign against the slave trade was not seen as necessarily conflicting with a policy of very limited commitment to the region. Livingstone wascornered into admitting to the Select Committee that domestic slavery in the interior of Africa was no real problem; it was the demands of the exterior trade which brought misery. With the prospect of being able to use naval patrols and to exert sufficient pressure on Zanzibar to end the trade by treaty, there seemed no need for initiatives in the interior such as Livingstone was now proposing. There was even doubt in some quarters as to whether the British were called upon to interfere with the East African slave trade at all since they had never had any direct part in it. The Indian authorities were certainly somewhat lukewarm about the problem of slave holding by British protected Indian subjects in Zanzibar. Generally, however, foreign ministers, most of their officials, and, of course, the Prime Minister, Palmerston, remained wedded to gradual abolition of the trade; W. H. Wylde, head of the Foreign Office Slave Trade Department, was obviously in favor of a cautious forward policy. On the other hand, Edmund Hammond, the Permanent Under-Secretary, was, according to Livingstone, a great advocate of "stinginess." Others, outside the Foreign Office, felt that Britain could rest content with what it had done on the West Coast. The Treasury, as might be expected, was a particularly formidable opponent of further measures in East Africa, as Lord Campbell pointed out in the House of Lords in 1872.

5. Report of the Select Committee on West African Settlements, 1865 (412), 227-228, 230-231. "I don't believe that the Government would take any part of the Sultan of Zanzibar's dominions, in as much as it would give the Tories a hold on them for taking new territory while unable to manage what they already have." Livingstone to Kirk, 28 Feb. 1865 in R. Foskett, The Zambesi Doctors (Edinburgh, 1964), 102.


corroborated by a Treasury memorandum of 1871 which complained that years of great expenditure on anti-slave trade activities had brought "no favourable result."9 Such views would obviously have had great force in relation to Livingstone in 1864-1865. He had just returned from leading the Zambesi Expedition, which had cost the government £50,000 yet appeared to have ended in failure if not, indeed, disaster.

Doubts about Britain's general role in Africa and about more specific concerns with the slave trade were negative reasons for questioning Livingstone's plans in 1865. But a more positive difficulty for the British government was that of relations with Portugal. Whatever his aims eventually became, Livingstone had initially envisaged his return to Africa being a more modest continuation of what he had tried to do on the Zambesi Expedition, that is, to take the first steps towards establishing Christianity and lawful commerce in the Zambesi basin, especially in the Lake Nyasa region.10 Livingstone frequently said that the principal obstacle to progress in the region was the Portuguese presence on the coast, their claims to suzerainty over the interior, and their slave trading; his published account of the Zambesi Expedition was conceived as a diatribe against the Portuguese.

On their part the Portuguese feared that Livingstone was an agent of British imperialism. They also bitterly resented his attacks on their administration of the Zambesi region and his questioning of the scientific value of their geographical discoveries. It is clear that, if Livingstone showed racial prejudice, it was against Portuguese like the explorer and trader, Silva Porto, rather than against Africans. Reacting to such slights, the Portuguese government caused a Reply to Dr. Livingstone's Accusations and Misrepresentations by José de Lacerda to be circulated.11 Little sympathy was evoked and, until

10. H. H. Johnston, Livingstone and the Exploration of Central Africa (London, 1891), 290-291. Livingstone's asking the government, when he was approached in January 1865 about whether he wanted a formal honor or pension of some kind from the Crown, only to secure "free access to the African Highlands by means of the Zambesi and Shire rivers, to be formally ratified by treaty with Portugal," is an indication of his thinking. A. Z. Fraser, Livingstone and Newstead (London, 1913), 142-143.
11. (London, 1865), especially 24-39; José de Lacerda later wrote a full-scale critique of Livingstone's work: Exame das Viagens do Doutor Livingstone (Lisboa, 1867).
recently, scholars writing in English have shown no disposition to question Livingstone’s aspersions on the Portuguese despite the quite evident injustice of much of what he said.12

Whatever the British Foreign Office felt about the Portuguese in East Africa, it could hardly officially endorse Livingstone’s campaign against a friendly ally. Thus, for example, it consistently refused to appoint a successor to Lyons McLeod, who had very briefly served as consul in Mozambique in 1857, despite calls in Parliament for this to be done as a measure for discouraging Portuguese slave trading.13 The British government could not but put faith in promises of the gradual implementation of Portuguese edicts against the slave trade and slavery in their dominions, particularly as it had in 1859 tamely and hypocritically allowed France to threaten the bombardment of Lisbon after the Portuguese had arrested the French slaving ship, Charles et Georges.14 It seems possible also that Prince Albert used his influence to discourage any moves that might seem further to threaten the East African claims of his cousin, the King of Portugal.15

In the end, therefore, the Foreign Office granted Livingstone a consular commission "in the territories of Africa not subject to the authority of the King of Portugal or the King of Abyssinia or the Viceroy of Egypt." But what were the limits of Portuguese authority? Livingstone would not have regarded the highlands around Lake Nyasa as being preempted by the Portuguese. It is true that his commission was also more generally defined as lying within the region bounded by latitudes 5°N and 5°S,16 but this made little difference; in the event Livingstone was only within these limits for brief periods on his last journey.

12. The Portuguese case is put in a little known article: Tom Price, "Portuguese Relations with David Livingstone," Scottish Geographical Magazine, LXXI (1955), 138-146. More recently Eric Axelson, Portugal and the Scramble for Africa 1875-1891 (Johannesburg, 1967), 24 ff., and R. J. Hammond, Portugal and Africa 1815-1910 (Stanford, 1966), 60-61 ff., have defended the Portuguese although Hammond's suggestion that bad relations now ensued and that the failure of the Congo Treaty of 1884 is partly attributable to Livingstone neglects the fact that Livingstone spoke favorably of the Portuguese in Angola and that British contempt for the Portuguese was very much in evidence long before Livingstone was on the scene. See also J. Duffy, Portuguese Africa (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), 187-188.


14. The Charles et Georges was taking part in the notorious "free labour emigration" scheme.


Perhaps it was Sir Roderick Murchison and the Royal Geographical Society who saved the government from further embarrassment with Lisbon by giving Livingstone a task which did take him well away from the areas which could reasonably be claimed by the Portuguese. It was Murchison -- "the best friend I ever had" according to Livingstone -- who persuaded the Foreign Office to give its sanction to the plan for the explorer to return to Africa.\(^{17}\) The Royal Geographical Society had been in contact with Livingstone since 1850. Murchison, who dominated the Society in the mid-century period, if he did not promote, at least stage-managed the tremendous public reception which Livingstone received in 1856-1858. Moreover, it was Murchison who gave Livingstone the entrée to fashionable, political, and scientific society. The mordant "armchair geographer," W. D. Cooley, one of the few commentators in Britain venturing to write disrespectfully of Livingstone, claimed that the Society needed the public notoriety which its connection with the great traveler afforded it, while Livingstone received the patronage he wanted in return.\(^{18}\) This spiteful comment was actually not far from the truth, although it is important to add that Murchison and the Royal Geographical Society arranged the patronage, because Livingstone was demonstrably the greatest scientific traveler to have worked in Africa. By 1865, in the confusion and controversies over the sources of the Nile created by the explorations of Burton, Speke, and Baker, the geographers badly needed the best scientific traveler available.\(^{19}\)

There had already been an unsuccessful attempt by the Royal Geographical Society to press on the government the desirability of a new Nile expedition from the north. Livingstone and his Zambesi companion, John Kirk, had both refused to promise to return to Africa to sort out the geographical problems posed when Richard Burton suggested in November 1864 that the Lake Tanganyika he had discovered was a source of the Nile.\(^{20}\) But, within a month or so, Murchison was to persuade Livingstone to change his mind. After a visit to him just before Christmas in 1864 Murchison wrote early in the new year with a definite proposal that his friend should return to Africa on an expedition promoted by the Royal Geographical Society. The aims would be to settle the

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"watershed or watersheds of South Africa" or, in other words, to find out if the ultimate sources of the Nile were farther south than Speke's Lake Victoria.

Perhaps because of the help the Royal Geographical Society could give and the influence that Murchison could exert on leading figures in Palmerston's government, Livingstone accepted the proposal as the most convenient way to secure support for a return to Africa. As Blaikie and later biographers have emphasized, Livingstone was upset by Murchison's originally asking him to go out "unshackled by other avocations than those of the geographical explorer," and he replied that he preferred "to have intercourse with the people, and do what I can by talking to enlighten them on the slave trade, and give them some idea of our religion." On the other hand there is no doubt that Livingstone had a very considerable, if pardonable, pride in his skill as a geographical explorer. Moreover, for him, "the mere animal pleasure of travelling in a wild unexplored country" was very great.

Murchison was probably reflecting an official view and trying to steer Livingstone away from embarrassing encounters with the Portuguese when he wrote of disavowing "other avocations" and was, also, extremely anxious to have the Nile problem solved. In any case the record of his public utterances acquires him of any real lack of sympathy for Livingstone's Christian and humanitarian objectives. Certainly Livingstone's own references to Murchison during his last journey never abated in warmth.

The same cannot be said for the explorer's references to all other members of the Royal Geographical Society. His vanity as a scientist was pricked by the instructions which the council of the Society issued to him when he agreed to work for them, as was normal practice; but Livingstone considered that he knew more about the problems confronting him than did the three men who compiled the instructions, Admiral Sir George Back, Sir Francis Galton, and the cartographer, John Arrowsmith. Livingstone bore a grudge against the latter for altering one of his manuscript maps for publication. Although the instructions stated that the Royal Geographical Society would not hamper such "an accomplished explorer" with detailed directions, he was required to furnish copies of his maps and reports and asked to take particular note of the rainfall and hydrography of the interior. Livingstone declared he would not let Arrowsmith lay hands on any of his material and that, as for hydrography, the "busy-bodies of the council" did not know that it meant.

23. Committee Minutes, 27 June 1865, Correspondence File, Livingstone to Maclear, July 1868, RGSA. Perhaps Galton's pedantry was an irritant, but the use of "hydrography" to denote inland waters was unusual rather than incorrect.
His rejection of the instructions left Livingstone's relations with the Royal Geographical Society in a somewhat uncertain state. It was not clear, then, exactly what the connection was between Livingstone and either the government or the Society. Nevertheless, as far as most people were concerned, what Livingstone announced when he published his Zambesi volume in the autumn of 1865 summed up his plans. The government and the Royal Geographical Society had united to aid him in "another attempt to open Africa to civilizing influences." He would go inland via the Rovuma and then north of the territory which the Portuguese claimed and endeavor to commence in East Africa the system of lawful commerce and missions inland, backed by naval activities on the coast, to end the slave trade. Going on north of Lake Nyasa and south of Lake Tanganyika, he would try to ascertain the watershed in that part of Africa.24

Livingstone's statement accurately reflected his continuing desire to begin the regeneration of Africa, but to go further and assess his real feelings about precisely how this should be done is extremely difficult. Almost certainly he did want to see the areas he was to explore under the British flag, because that would be the best guarantee of protection for missionaries, traders, and perhaps settlers. But he realized that he could not expect such a development in his lifetime, although he hoped for limited British controlled establishments. H. A. C. Cairns has suggested that Livingstone envisaged solving the problems of Africa and the Scottish poor in one process of colonization but never resolved the contradiction of settlers also becoming masters. But possibly he had relinquished the idea of European settlement on any considerable scale by 1865; he was then discussing the best way of developing an African middle class as a regenerative influence. He was quite clear that missions were a necessary element in the process; whether they aimed at being "industrial" as well as preaching agencies or not, they never failed to promote civilization and commerce.25 It may be that Livingstone towards the end of his life was beginning to shift his opinion about the best way to end the slave trade. Some of his comments suggest that he saw that Christianity and legitimate commerce would not themselves supersede the trade once it already had a hold in any area: the trade would have actually to be stopped before civilizing influences could come in to repair the damage.26

The discussion of Livingstone's views and his attitude to his task on his last journey properly requires some understanding of his inner personality. It is not enough to write of the "psychological efficacy of belief in divine support."27

25. Cairns, Prelude, 195-196, 198; Livingstone to Kirk, 8 June 1865, Poskett, Zambesi Doctors, 118-119; Select Committee on West African Settlements (412), 228, 231.
26. Ibid., 233.
27. Cairns, Prelude, 155.
Seaver's rejection of the suggestion that he was a "mystic" and his conclusion that Livingstone was a practical idealist who drove himself to death, though not deliberately, is the most helpful discussion so far. Livingstone's Scottish background needs very much to be taken into account, and Professor Shepperson has provided an excellent starting point. One difficulty about Livingstone's attitude to the last journey which has particularly exercised biographers is how to explain what Harry Johnston said "almost became a monomania with him" -- the desire to prove that he had found the sources of the Nile. Professor Debenham likened it to a "quest for the Holy Grail," which again suggests mysticism, but he is perhaps nearer to the truth in claiming that, as his expedition progressed, Livingstone was increasingly harassed by a sense of the failure of all his plans for Africa; the discovery of the Nile sources was one task at least that he might accomplish before he died.

The growing sense of failure no doubt developed as the journey progressed, but there is no real reason to believe that, at the outset of his journey, Livingstone would have rejected the idea that discovering the sources of the Nile had any importance. That he did not emphasize it unduly in 1865 may have been in deference to the memory of the recently deceased Speke, but it is clear that it was very much in his mind. There was for Livingstone no real dichotomy between his geography and his missionary work. When Cooley wrote that his geographical results were obtained "by the resolute sacrifice of missionary interests," and when by contrast Blaikie tried to prove that Livingstone never "dropt the missionary to become the explorer," they both missed the point. Livingstone wrote in 1872 that to him the value of discovering the Nile sources was that the resulting fame would enable him to "open his mouth with power among men" about the evil of the slave trade. Yet this is only a partial explanation and in any case not wholly a true one since Livingstone clearly did covet the scientific fame for its own sake. Livingstone saw it as a necessary part of the missionary's job to stop the slave trade and promote the penetration of Africa by "civilized and Christian society as a whole." Exploration was the first stage in this penetration. "I shall make this beautiful land better known," he wrote, "which is an essential part of the process by which it will become 'the pleasant haunts of man.'" The oft quoted maxim from Missionary Travels that he viewed "the end of the geographical feat as the beginning of the missionary enterprise" should be seen in its proper context. When he first used a similar phrase in a letter to Murchison, he talked of the enterprise.

31. Cooley, Livingstone, 6; Blaikie, Livingstone, 295, 374.
33. Waller, Last Journals, 1, 168.
embracing the work of "geographers labouring to make men better acquainted
with each other, soldiers fighting against oppression and sailors rescuing
captives in deadly climes . . . as well as missionaries." In other words
the distinction between geographical and missionary work which the phrase as
it is usually quoted implies, did not really exist for Livingstone.34

This does not mean that Livingstone fell into the too common error of
equating nineteenth-century civilization with Christianity, though some have
thought so. His view was that it was proper to use all the adjuncts of civiliza-
tion for God's work. The veteran geologist, Professor Adam Sedgwick,
well understood this when he wrote in reference to Livingstone's faith that
religious and moral truth could not be divorced from natural truth; "all art
and science, and all material discoveries (each held in its proper place and
subordination) may be used to minister to the diffusion of Christian truth among
men." In practice this meant Livingstone could claim, "I am serving Christ
when shooting a buffalo for my men or taking an observation,"35 though it does
not follow that he thought that every explorer who did these things was neces-
sarily serving Christ.

The relative importance attached to the last journey by Livingstone,
his friends, the government, and the Royal Geographical Society is usually
gauged by the amount of money each was prepared to contribute to the ex-
penses. The explorer himself proposed to sell his boat, the Lady Nyassa, which
had cost him £6000 when he had it built for the Zambesi Expedition. He was
able to get only £2300 for it -- all of which was lost in a bank failure in Bombay.
The £6000 had come from the profit on his first book, Missionary Travels.
He had no salary in 1865, and the remaining profits of his books must have been
heavily committed to the upkeep of his family as well as to many of his own ex-
penses. His dependants, in fact, appear to have been in some need by 1872,
when one of his sons joined a relief expedition in the hope of being able to
persuade Livingstone to return and repair the fortunes of his "forgotten
family."36 Gifts from friends and public testimonials eased some of Living-
stone's financial worries, and in 1865 £645 was subscribed for him at Bombay,37
while his old friend, James Young, had given him £1000 for the purposes of his
new expedition. It was not the last nor the least sum which James Young would
advance for Livingstone's sake. Harry Johnston's calculations of Livingstone's

34. D. Livingstone, Missionary Travels . . . (London, 1857), 673-674;
     Journal Royal Geographical Society, XXVII (1857), 374.
35. Sedgwick to Livingstone, 10 Feb. 1858, quoted in Blaikie, Livingstone,
     200-202; J. P. R. Wallis, The Zambesi Expedition of David Livingstone
36. Seaver, Livingstone, 601.
37. R. J. Campbell, Livingstone (London, 1929), 300. It is not clear whether
     this money was also lost in the bank failure.
income, although misleading in some respects, do serve to show that he did not personally reap much financial reward from his activities which was not returned to the service of Africa in some way.

Johnston's figures are somewhat misleading because he, like all other biographers, makes the assumption that all Livingstone received from the government and the Royal Geographical Society for the support of his last journey was £500 from each. This is not true. But the £500 grants at the outset of the journey did appear small, and many writers have condemned the Foreign Office and the Royal Geographical Society for their "ludicrously inadequate" grants, their "shabby" treatment of the great explorer, and their "sheer meanness." Writing in the imperial era, Johnston feelingly condemned the government for so poorly rewarding a pioneer of British enterprise while he pointed out that the Royal Geographical Society had received considerable renown and income as a result of its close connection with Livingstone. Taking a kinder view, Coupland explained the relative paucity of the grants by saying that no one expected the journey to take very long. Simmons suggests that the lack of generosity on the part of the Royal Geographical Society may have stemmed from its doubt of how much geographical work Livingstone would do.

All of these criticisms misread the situation. First of all, as far as the Royal Geographical Society was concerned, this was one of the largest grants it had ever made to a traveler. It is true that in the early days of its existence larger amounts had been given to three explorers. But this occurred only because the inexperience of the Society in financial matters led to its paying out more than it intended. No doubt in January 1865 the Royal Geographical Society assumed that the Foreign Office would offer a reasonable sum—something like the grants of £1000 and £2500 which had been made to Burton and Speke. In the circumstances the Royal Geographical Society was being unusually generous because it now normally only promoted exploration, giving small grants for instruments but leaving the major financing to others. On the other hand it must be admitted that it had been prepared a year before to pay £1000 towards a full-scale Nile expedition conducted by the government. Even so, there would have been more than one person involved if that plan had matured. What is more important in this situation is that not only was £500

38. Johnston, Livingstone, 291-292 & n., who makes for his life a total of £21,000 income, an immediately apparent expenditure of £7000 plus two-thirds of the cost of his last eight years' work. This seems to mean an average annual income of £100 for his career.
39. Ibid., 291; Debenham, Way to Ilala, 219; Campbell, Livingstone, 298.
40. Coupland, Livingstone's Last Journey, 26; Simmons, Livingstone, 114.
41. C. R. Markham, The Fifty Years' Work of the Royal Geographical Society (London, 1881), 150; R.G.S. to Palmerston and Russell, 26 March, 1864, RGSA.
an unusually large sum by normal Royal Geographical Society standards, but that it was also by no means all the Society would actually spend on Livingstone in the last years of his life. All in all it provided some £3000 for his direct or indirect benefit.

There may be more of a case for claiming that the government was ungenerous to Livingstone. But again the £500 was only a small fraction of the total sum it eventually spent on him, although the Royal Geographical Society and Murchison often had to push very hard to get more. In order to avoid requests on his behalf, the Foreign Office liked to assume that Livingstone was the Society's responsibility while the Society worked on the opposite assumption. For this reason the negotiations which led to the explorer's being given £500 and a consulship by the Foreign Office in 1865 are important.

It was Murchison, through constant personal communication to Henry Layard, the Under-Secretary of State, and to Earl Russell, who prompted the Foreign Office to give its sanction to the plan for Livingstone to return to Africa. He reported Russell's favorable response at the end of January 1865. The explorer was asked to call at the Foreign Office on March 11 when Layard put forward the idea of the roving consulship. Later in the month the proposals were put before him officially in the form of a letter of appointment. "This commission as Her Majesty's Consul has been given to you," ran the letter, "solely with a view to assist you in the important journey you are about to undertake." The duties connected with the appointment were to establish friendly relations with the chiefs, point out to them the advantages of "legitimate commerce" and of cultivating the fertile soils of their territories, and to look out for products which could be of use to English trade. Livingstone was also to find the principal lines of communication in the interior and send full information about the slave trade as well as the geography, culture, and language of the region. Dispatches on such matters were to be transmitted to the Foreign Office but must be separated into "geographical" and "official" ones, so that the former could be sent on to the Royal Geographical Society and the latter retained. Writing these dispatches was the only formal duty laid upon him. To avoid upsetting either the Portuguese or the British Treasury, Livingstone was actually chided not to "enter into any engagement... which might be an embarrassment to Her Majesty's Government."

In the next few years there were to be arguments within the Foreign Office as to whether Livingstone, holding such a commission, could be regarded as a regular member of the consular service. At the time, as the first quoted sentence shows, the assumption was clearly that he was not.

42. Committee Minutes, 31 Jan. 1865, ibid.; Wylde's memo. on R.G.S. to F.O., 13 Apr. 1874, F.O. 2/49B.
The letter to Livingstone ended by telling him that he could have £500 but that no more would be given in the future and that no claims for a pension would be accepted by the government.43

According to Blaikie, Livingstone objected to the last paragraph, because he had not asked for anything; he resented being treated like a "charwoman." Blaikie goes on to say that Russell was appealed to and refused to do anything about a salary until Livingstone had settled down somewhere. Later biographers have followed Blaikie and have deprecated Russell's attitude. But the Foreign Office records tell a rather different story. It was, said a later document, upon Livingstone's "gentle remonstrance" that the appointment was amended.44 Russell penned a memorandum on April 26 saying of the last paragraph: "I never intended this and I wish the letter to be withdrawn as he is a regular consul to fifty black chiefs instead of one white one." This seems to indicate that Russell now thought Livingstone's appointment should be treated as an orthodox one. Russell's attitude was apparently made known to Livingstone through Lord Clarendon and Murchison, and he returned the letter of appointment so that it could be amended. It then seems to have been reissued to him without the offending paragraph.45 Although this deletion removed the immediate difficulty, no promise was made to the explorer that he would be given a pension or salary. However, at this stage everyone was thinking in terms of a journey lasting about two years, and Murchison was presumably content to wait until Livingstone returned before beginning a campaign to get him a permanent pension. As it was, the withdrawal of the paragraph left matters in the air with no public acknowledgment of Russell's view that Livingstone was a regular consul. The fact that the withdrawal had been made, however, did leave the Royal Geographical Society with an avenue of attack open to them for the future.

Livingstone left Britain in August 1865 and, after periods in Bombay and Zanzibar to make further arrangements for his journey, set off into the interior via the Rovuma Valley in April 1866. He was making an interesting experiment in the use of various types of animals for transport purposes, but it failed completely, throwing him back on the resources of his very inadequate human companions.46 Livingstone seemed disinclined to lead the conventional type of expedition with a properly organized "caravan" of porters, probably because he

43. Russell to Livingstone, 28 March 1865, F.O. 84/1249.
44. Blaikie, Livingstone, 296; Vivian's memo., 8 Apr. 1870, F.O. 2/49B.
46. Waller, Last Journals, I, 9-21, 42-45, 92, 177, etc.
realized that he was not cut out for the task. In fact Livingstone was a very poor leader of men -- and not just of other Europeans as is conventionally asserted; only a few individuals like Kirk or Susi and Chuma found it temperamentally possible to remain unswervingly loyal to such a withdrawn, self-sufficient character as he had become. Livingstone's ideals were noble and unselfish, but he often tried to put them into practice with insufficient regard for the capabilities and feelings of those associated with him. At any rate, his inability or disinclination to lead a conventional caravan was to cost him dearly on the last journey.

The first unfortunate result of these deficiencies involved also the first claim upon the British government for further aid. Being unable to boat across Lake Nyasa, Livingstone had traveled around the south end of it, although he had been expected to go round the northern end to solve the problem of whether it was linked to Lake Tanganyika. The change of plan had been dictated by the fear among his porters of "Mazitu" (Ngoni) marauders. In June 1866 the ten Comoro islanders in his party deserted and used the fact of the Ngoni presence to fashion a convenient excuse for their defection when they returned to the coast.

The outside world had heard nothing of Livingstone until the Comoro islanders reached Zanzibar. The British Consul, Dr. Seward, reporting in December 1866, told the story they had concocted to explain their return. The explorer had been slain by "Zulus" (Ngoni) just after crossing the northern end of the lake. The men claimed that all his effects had been stolen so that they could bring back no relics to prove their story, although they had buried the body. Seward tried to obtain corroboration of their story at Kilwa because he found the account "disturbingly vague and untrustworthy." Kirk, now at Zanzibar as agency surgeon and vice-consul, also went to Kilwa but seems to have been more disposed to accept the story. He felt the account of the places visited accorded well with Livingstone's planned itinerary.47 It is doubtful whether the Comorans intended to be so subtle, but the main weakness of their story seemed like corroboration, as no one else knew that Livingstone had been forced to go round the south end of the lake.

The Foreign Office decided to leave to the Royal Geographical Society the decision as to whether the story was to be accepted as the truth. Murchison said there would be "an intense reaction of distress" in the Society and, although he clung to lingering hope, could hardly bring himself to doubt that Livingstone was dead. A meeting of the Society considered the dispatches from Seward and Kirk. The latter's map, constructed from the story of the Comorans and showing the accord with Livingstone's plans, seemed to clinch the matter. Sir Samuel Baker accepted the story, remarking helpfully that all natives of Africa were

47. Waller, Last Journals, I, 115; Seward to Chief Secretary Bombay, 10 Dec. 1866, Seward to Stanley, 23 Dec. 1866, 26 Jan. 1867. E36, Zanzibar Archives.
"exceedingly brutal and savage." Murchison was one of the few speakers to maintain doubts. He said that the only way to be sure was to send out an expedition; he had already received an offer to lead one from E. D. Young. Young knew Musa, leader of the Comoran porters, from his experience on the Zambesi Expedition and felt that he was untrustworthy. He promised to take a boat past the Murchison Cataracts on the Shire, launch it upon Lake Nyasa, and seek news of the explorer. Subject to the financial support and approval of the government, the Royal Geographical Society decided to endorse this plan. Murchison was now launched on one of the campaigns which he knew so well how to conduct, and events moved swiftly.

The Royal Geographical Society asked the Foreign Office for all the aid in its power, reminding it that Livingstone was one of Her Majesty’s consuls. The under-secretary who dealt with the appeal was not enthusiastic. "There is something distressing in the anxiety to incur the risk of a new expedition in order to make certain that the intelligence already received of Dr. Livingstone’s death is correct," he wrote. But he and Lord Stanley, the Foreign Secretary, were willing to support the plan if the Admiralty would take the onus of implementing it. The Admiralty quickly agreed to release Young and, with some prompting from Murchison, also managed to obtain £650 from the Treasury to build a sailing boat of steel sections, each weighing no more than fifty pounds. Young was also given paid leave by the Navy while J. Reid, who had also served on the Zambesi Expedition, was engaged at £150 per annum, together with two other volunteers. The Royal Geographical Society agreed to pay £100 towards Young’s remuneration, and in the end contributed £160. The Society’s instructions simply told Young to get to the lake but to go inland from the northern end only if he had to. He was to bring back definite information and not to be misled by rumors. By June 10 the expedition had left England. It was remarkably well conducted and incontrovertibly proved that Livingstone had safely passed round the south of Lake Nyasa.

Before Young had completed his mission, a slave arriving at Zanzibar had picked out a photograph of the explorer as the likeness of a man he had seen at Marungo, 650 miles away in the interior. By December 1867 people in England were certain that Livingstone was alive, and Young’s return and report the following month was something of an anti-climax.

49. E. D. Young, The Search after Livingstone (London, 1868), 22-39; Council Minutes, 9 Apr. 1867, Committee Minutes, 15 Apr. 1867, RGSA.
50. Murchison to Murray, 17 Apr. 1867, and memo. by Murray, Murray to R.G.S., 20 Apr. 1867, F.O. 84/1284.
51. Letter Book, Murchison to Lennox, 30 Apr. 1867, Committee Minutes, 13 May, 16 May, 5 June 1867, Council Minutes, 3 June 1867, RGSA.
Nevertheless Young was given another 500 by the Admiralty while the Royal Geographical Society gave Reid £50. Thus the government had spent at least £1200 and the Royal Geographical Society over £200 in the cause of Livingstone, although the explorer did not gain any direct benefit from this expedition.

While the defaulting Comoro porters languished in irons at Zanzibar, Livingstone went farther into the interior, reaching Lake Bangweulu in July 1868. He returned westward to the Lualaba from Ujiji late in 1869, because he imagined he might be near the sources of the Nile. His own speculations were matched by intense interest in the question among geographers in Britain. But few of Livingstone’s numerous letters got through to England, except for one batch which arrived there in November 1869. These, and one which arrived shortly afterward, not only gave Livingstone’s views on the Nile but also made it clear that he was in dire need of medicines and supplies. Kirk, though hindered by cholera at Zanzibar, was attempting to send him some personal provisions, but it was becoming increasingly obvious that relief organized on a reasonably large scale was needed.

Fearing that Livingstone would resent another European joining him, Murchison rejected several offers to lead relief expeditions and bent his energies toward making the government pay for adequate supplies to be sent inland from Zanzibar. In March 1870 the Royal Geographical Society sent an official letter to Lord Clarendon, Foreign Secretary for the new Liberal government, reminding him that Livingstone, though a consul, had "received no money from the government or any public body in England" since 1865. "He has therefore," the letter went on, "been five years de facto in Her Majesty’s service exclusive of the years when he formerly served as H.M. consul at Quillimane conducting the Zambesi expedition." He should be given the full consular salary for the five years, a concession which "would be applauded by the whole British nation." By embellishing the letter with exclamation marks, an official signified his appreciation of the subtle blackmail in the last remark. Clarendon must have pointed out privately to Murchison that Livingstone’s appointment had been made by the last administration but one, when Russell was Foreign Secretary, and was nothing to do with him. Murchison said in a personal letter that he realized this but nevertheless hoped that Clarendon would "on consideration not allow it to become a subject of public disappointment." The letter continues:

53. Council Minutes, 24 Jan. 1868, RGSA.
56. Livingstone to Kirk, 30 May 1869, F.O. 2/49B; The Times, 10 Nov. 1869.
57. F.O. to R.G.S., 18 Nov. 1869, F.O. 84/1312; F.O. to R.G.S., 14 March 1870, F.O. 84/1332.
58. Murchison to Clarendon, 31 March 1870, F.O. 2/49B.
Having myself great regard for Lord Russell it will pain him exceedingly if that letter should ever be made known, officially and publicly. . . . I therefore beseech you to take the best and honourable line and by recognizing L[ivingstone] as a British consul of five years standing. Let the salary for that period be paid over to him and then this . . . so naturally coming from the Minister who first appointed a consul at Quillimane will be duly appreciated by the nation.59

"That letter" was, of course, the original letter of appointment in 1865 to which Livingstone had objected. C. Vivian in the Foreign Office now suggested that, although the paragraph in the original letter had been struck out, it was never intended to give Livingstone a salary. Clarendon asked for a comprehensive memorandum which he could show the Cabinet outlining the circumstances under which Livingstone had received his appointment in 1859, what the objects of the present post were, and how long the employment was supposed to last. The resulting study by Vivian suggested that Livingstone had been recalled from Quillimane post in 1863 through difficulties his activities caused in Portuguese relations but that Russell and Palmerston had been pleased with his work. The principal object of his present appointment was to allow him to explore until he had discovered the Nile sources but that he was also to establish friendly relations with chiefs, inquire into the resources of the country, etc. In fact, said Vivian, he was "to perform all the duties of a consul." But another official disagreed, saying that Livingstone was acting as a consul "where there are no ordinary consular duties to discharge!"

Clarendon obviously felt some unease about the whole matter, for he wrote "Murchison is in a state of rabid excitement" and will "appeal to the nation" if his "illustrious friend" is not properly remunerated. He gave instructions to write to Murchison in the sense of Vivian's memorandum without any allusion being made to the paragraph being struck out of the 1865 letter.60 The Cabinet had apparently been disinclined to offer any immediate financial aid for Livingstone. The draft official reply to Murchison said that the explorer must return home when his remuneration would be estimated. Clarendon changed this to "whether any and, if so, what remuneration." It was insisted that the government regarded the 1865 appointment as having been made on a "footing entirely distinct from that of 1859.61

Murchison's response was to allege that Livingstone could neither advance nor retreat without supplies. The public believed, he went on, that the efforts being made by Kirk were at public expense. In fact, he said, money was being borrowed at nine percent. Three years' salary -- £1500 -- must be given,

59. Murchison to Clarendon, 1 Apr. 1870, F.O. 2/49B.
60. Memos. by Vivian, 2 Apr., 8 Apr., by Clarendon, 3 Apr., 10 Apr., and undated, 1870, ibid.
or there would be an "outburst of astonishment," and the Royal Geographical Society would shame the government by launching a public subscription. Murchison intimated that, although he had kept his counsel so far, he would publish the 1865 letter (of which, apparently, Lord Russell denied all knowledge) unless the government changed its mind. Then the public would assuredly "resent an instruction by which a distinguished traveller (I may say the idol of the nation) is thrown into the heart of Africa and expected to live upon his own slender means for years."

The blackmail seems to have worked at the second attempt. Apparently the issue had again been put before the Cabinet, which now recommended a government grant. But it still insisted that Livingstone return. Murchison promised to call off plans for an appeal to the country but protested about the requirement that the explorer return. He asked for a few months grace and called on Clarendon with a map to be put before the Cabinet showing the importance of Livingstone's Nile source discovery in Latitude 10°-12°S. Clarendon stood firm, however, and the Royal Geographical Society was informed that £1000 would be advanced to Zanzibar to purchase supplies for Livingstone. The explorer himself was told of the grant and ordered home, but was assured that the government and people of Britian admired him more than ever.62 James Young gave him some money to supplement the government grant, and so the episode closed in England. Murchison was satisfied, because he knew that Livingstone would never obey the order to return until he had solved the remaining geographical problems. Nevertheless, the basic issue remained unsettled: the government had managed to avoid explicitly admitting that the explorer was their employee; it showed little desire to back his work and had been shamed into action only by the threat of public execration.

Meanwhile, the caravan that Kirk had dispatched in response to Livingstone's appeal in 1869 had reached him west of Lake Tanganyika on February 4, 1871, despite the cholera epidemic. But it was a caravan of only ten men, and the goods entrusted to them had been pilfered and sold for the personal profit of Sherif, the caravan leader.63 Livingstone returned to Ujiji in October 1871 as badly off as before; in fact he was on the point of starving. It was now eighteen months since Murchison had persuaded the Foreign Office to afford some relief funds. The caravans which were dispatched from Zanzibar as a result fared even worse than Kirk's caravan of October 1869. Arrangements in England and Zanzibar had been made with commendable promptitude, and by

62. Murchison to Clarendon, 6 May 1870 and private of same date, 9 May 1870, Clarendon to Murchison, 19 May 1870, Clarendon to Livingstone, 31 May 1870, F.O. 2/49B.
63. Coupland, Livingstone's Last Journey, 91-99. But Coupland does not distinguish between this caravan and those Kirk later sent using the government funds.
November 1870 Consul Churchill had purchased various goods, including over 3000 yards of merikani, for Livingstone to pay his way in future. All this plus the hire of twenty-five porters cost about £350. Churchill went home in the following month. Kirk found two months later that the men Churchill had hired had not left Bagamoyo and superintended their departure. Livingstone's miserable situation had prompted him to complain to Kirk that the November 1869 caravan should never have been entrusted to slaves, which, he said, was the status of the porters engaged through the agency of Ludha Damji, the representative of the firm of Jairam Sewji. A short while afterwards he heard of the £1000 grant and of the consequent dispatch of the November 1870 caravan -- again through the agency of Ludha Damji. His bitterness against Kirk for this mismanagement increased, though the responsibility had, in fact, been Churchill's. A whole year had been spent, he complained, in feasting slaves with money meant for him. The news of the grant and the caravan reached Livingstone through H. M. Stanley. The famous meeting took place at Ujiji in November 1871. Stanley later exacerbated the breach between Kirk and Livingstone by alleging that Kirk's visit to Bagamoyo in the previous February had been simply a hunting trip during which he had done nothing to hasten the departure of the caravan.

In Britain during 1871 relatively little anxiety was felt by the Royal Geographical Society about the explorer. The £1000 Murchison, who died in October 1871, had secured for Livingstone was about to reach him in the form of goods and porters. Moreover, it was now clear that Stanley was on the main caravan route to Tabora and Ujiji. When the Royal Geographical Society began its 1871-1872 session in November, the new president, Sir Henry Rawlinson, said there must be painful suspense over Livingstone but that Stanley seemed to have the aptitude for travel and also the advantage of the support of Speke's former headman, "Bombay." If he reached Livingstone and helped to solve the Nile problem, this determined young man would be treated as warmly by the Society as if he were an Englishman working under its auspices. As far as Rawlinson knew, Stanley was traveling at his own expense for the "love of adventure and discovery." But a fortnight later news arrived of the war in Unyamwezi between the Arabs of Tabora and Mirambo, and anxiety for Livingstone mounted once again. Kirk's report of the probable loss of Livingstone's supplies and the uncertainty of Stanley's fate seemed to call for the Society to take some positive measures.

64. F.O. to Churchill, 2 July 1870, F.O. 2/49B; Kirk to Granville, 18 Feb., 28 Feb., 10 March 1871, E61, Zanzibar Archives.
66. Ibid., 63-66.
The council, after meeting on December 11, suggested to the Foreign Office that Kirk be empowered to offer £100 to the first person to bring definite news of the explorer and that an expedition should be organized. Viscount Enfield, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, said that something might be arranged if money could be secured, but Granville, now the Foreign Secretary, noted that even the Royal Geographical Society seemed to be vague about what it was prepared to do.

It seems to have been Galton who took the initiative in persuading the Society to consider more definite plans for an expedition. The idea was accepted. The Royal Geographical Society hoped to get £1500 from public subscriptions, would give £500 itself, and expected only £500 from the exchequer. The Prime Minister was directly approached and asked to use his influence to ensure the Society got this amount.

While this application was being considered, the organization of the expedition went ahead with great rapidity, probably because James Gordon Bennett had now revealed to the world that Stanley was his employee and had definitely been sent to look for Livingstone. The Royal Geographical Society was determined not to be outshone by a mere newspaper reporter, and an American at that. The council of January 8, 1872, set up a committee to choose a leader for the expedition from among the forty who already had applied. By the time of the next meeting of the Society on January 22 the Livingstone committee had chosen Lieutenant Llewellyn S. Dawson, R.N., to lead the expedition. The choice seems to have lain between him and another naval lieutenant, V. L. Cameron, who had seen anti-slave trade patrol service on the East African coast. But Dawson was a naval hydrographer and the committee was influenced by Galton's idea that the expedition must do scientific work as well as looking for Livingstone. There may have been some dispute about this since Sir Bartle Frere, a vice-president of the Society, had earlier said that the expedition should confine itself to the latter object. Had the intention been more clearly stated, much subsequent trouble could have been avoided. Another special committee accepted the offers of Lieutenant Henn, R.N., and Livingstone's third son, Oswell, to accompany Dawson. The United Free Methodist Mission gave Charles New permission to join the others in Zanzibar and act as interpreter. Free transport by one of the first ships to sail straight through

67. Proc. RGS, XVI (1872), 88, 102-104, 124-125; Council Minutes, 11 Dec. 1871, RGSA.

68. Rawlinson to Enfield, 13 Dec. 1871, Enfield’s note, 15 Dec. 1871, Memo. annexed by Vivian, undated, F.O. 2/49B.

69. Correspondence File, Galton to Rawlinson, 1 Jan. 1872, Committee Minutes, 2 Jan. 1872, Letter Book, Rawlinson to Lowe and to Gladstone, 3 Jan. 1872, RGSA.
the Suez Canal was offered by Wiseman and Co. By the end of January virtually all the arrangements had been made. The committee was then at leisure to re-
ject the many offers of help still pouring in, including that of a Canadian professor who proposed to rescue Livingstone by balloon.70

But the government had not proved amenable over money. The Treasury replied to the Society's application by saying that the scheme was "too doubtful to warrant public expenditure." A new expedition, it was said, "is not the only means through which Dr. Livingstone's safety may with reason be hoped for."71 Similar responses were made to Parliamentary questions. When the Society was told of this attitude on January 22, there was a tremendous outcry. An official in the Foreign Office filed a cutting from the Times reporting this meeting, and he added to it, "Geographical Society declares war against an incompetent Govt." In fact it was the Foreign Office which came to the rescue by suggesting to the Treasury that the Royal Geographical Society might be allowed to draw on the balance of the 1870 grant, which now stood at £654. Viscount Enfield managed to get the Treasury to agree to this before a big meeting, to be called by the Lord Mayor of London at the Society's request, could have the chance to criticize the government.72

The Treasury's financial contribution became unimportant except as a sign that the government was still interested in Livingstone, because the public response was so good. By the end of February well over £4000 had been raised, including £1000 from Glasgow, £700 from Edinburgh, and 100 guineas from the City of London. Individuals such as J. A. Grant, James Young, Count Platen of Sweden, and Mr. Cowasji Jehangir Ready-Money each gave £100. Over £5000 was eventually raised and in addition the Royal Geographical Society fur-
nished £696 from its funds for the expedition, which set sail from England on February 9. News was heard of the presence in Zanzibar of a mission from Buganda, with whom it was hoped Dawson would be able to travel up-country. Everything, as Rawlinson said, seemed to be "couleur de rose."73 But Kirk had received news of the planning of the expedition without much enthusiasm. He assumed that Dawson would have to wait for the proper traveling season, and in the meantime he proposed to try out the idea of sending messengers up-country to get definite news.74

71. Quoted in Proc. RGS, XVI (1871-72), 164.
73. Journal Royal Geographical Society, XLII (1872), cxxix; Proc. RGS, XVI (1871-72), 186, 442; Markham, Fifty Years' Work, 151.
At this time Livingstone was settled at Tabora ready to receive supplies which Stanley had promised to send up to him from the £500 balance of the government grant. Their joint examination of Lake Tanganyika had disposed of the idea that it could be a source of the Nile, and this knowledge made him more than ever anxious to retrace his steps to what he supposed to be the sources near Lake Bangweulu. As Stanley approached the coast on his return journey, news of his meeting with Livingstone reached England in April 1872.

Waiting in Tabora, Livingstone could have had little idea of the furore resulting from his meeting with Stanley. The £500 he wanted had, of course, been passed on to Dawson's expedition. But Dawson had resigned his position as leader before Stanley even arrived at the coast. The whole expedition had crossed to the mainland on the day that messengers sent ahead by Stanley reached Bagamoyo. On hearing their news, Dawson immediately returned to Zanzibar and, according to Stanley, after consulting Kirk, decided to withdraw. Henn also decided to back out. This left New in command, and he promised to perform the relatively simple and menial task of taking the supplies to Tabora. Henn now changed his mind and said that after all he would go, but New considered the young man to be so unstable a character that he refused to serve under him. Then Lieutenant Henn met Stanley when he arrived in Bagamoyo on May 6. It seems clear that Stanley positively discouraged him from going up to Tabora, and so Henn changed his mind again. New then again offered his services but later withdrew, probably under Kirk's guidance. This left Oswell Livingstone, but, within a few days, he too decided not to go to his father. The stores Livingstone wanted were drawn out of the expedition's own supplies and sent up to him under the care of an Arab.75

The rapid disintegration of the expedition came as a tremendous shock to the Royal Geographical Society. However anxious the Society might be to shift financial responsibility for Livingstone onto the government, it still regarded him as its traveler. It was now almost an impertinence for anyone calling himself an explorer to be in East Africa without its blessing. Not only had Stanley contacted Livingstone without consulting the Society, but he had in the process frustrated the best financed expedition it had ever sent to East Africa. Opinion in many other quarters in England seems also to have resented Stanley's success and held the Royal Geographical Society responsible for allowing this diminution of national prestige and wastage of publicly subscribed money (the expedition had cost £2300 but this still left £3500 in hand). Rawlinson had at first been inclined to think that Dawson had done the sensible thing in retiring. But Dawson's letter of resignation showed that Stanley had made the expedition feel that Livingstone's behavior had augured "but ill for what the reception of

the Royal Geographical Society's Expedition would have been." This implication made it look as though the national hero, Livingstone, was on bad terms with the Royal Geographical Society; the matter therefore needed to be investigated further.76

A Royal Geographical Society committee of investigation which met in September 1872 cut its way through many complications by deciding to regard Dawson's subordinates as having held no position and, therefore, no responsibility after his resignation. This left Dawson to explain the debacle. He submitted that Stanley's and Kirk's evidence had taught him that a trained surveyor, particularly one sent by the Royal Geographical Society, would not have been welcomed by Livingstone. A dispatch which had since arrived from the latter giving his "warmest thanks" for the idea of a search expedition and saying that he would have been glad to meet them and direct them to new work seemed to deal adequately with Dawson's arguments. The committee concluded that the disaster was Dawson's own fault. Many newspapers endorsed the verdict and with one bitter attack on the Society Dawson returned to comparative obscurity.77

It is impossible not to feel some sympathy for Dawson. His first impulse to resign seems to have been judged the right one at the time by both Kirk and Rawlinson. The Royal Geographical Society committee should perhaps have taken up Dawson's point that he was guided in his resignation by Kirk's knowledge of Livingstone's character. Kirk was extremely upset by Livingstone's blaming him for sending slaves to carry the 1869 and 1870 supplies and further ruffled by Stanley; he quite obviously strongly agreed with, if he did not actually recommend, Dawson's resigning.78 Coupland's work79 has so thoroughly exonerated Kirk from Stanley's insinuations that it is difficult to see him in a bad light. Nevertheless, although he was greatly provoked, he does share some of the blame for the disintegration of the Royal Geographical Society Expedition.

At this time Stanley was in England, and many members of the Royal Geographical Society still resented "the intrusion of the very uncongenial element of the worst type of Yankee journalism into questions connected with Dr. Livingstone."80 An uneasy truce was patched up eventually and Stanley mollified by the award of the Society's Gold Medal. As he disappeared to America, attention shifted back to Livingstone and the still unsolved problem of the source of the

77. Ibid., 430-433, 439-440; Committee Minutes, 2 Sept., 6 Sept., 9 Sept., 1872, RGSA.
78. Kirk to Granville, 9 May, 28 May 1872, F.O. 541/19.
80. C. R. Markham in Ocean Highways, II (1872-73), 153.
Nile. Yet another expedition was decided upon in November 1872, and this time V. L. Cameron was chosen to lead it. Sir Bartle Frere, about to undertake a mission to Zanzibar to negotiate a treaty completely curtailing the slave trade, would be on hand to prevent a second fiasco. James Young paid out another £2000 of his money to send Lieutenant Grandy to work his way up the Congo since everyone was convinced that Livingstone's sources of the Nile were in fact those of the former river.81

Cameron and his chosen companions were in Zanzibar early in 1873. £80 of the original Treasury grant and £370 from Dawson's fund (£388 worth of supplies had been sent to Livingstone) remained there, but £3000 of the public subscription of 1871 was left in England and held ready for Cameron's use.82 While Frere, among his many other tasks, investigated Livingstone's complaints about the slave caravans and exonerated Kirk,83 Cameron's preparations went ahead. Perhaps Frere did not supervise these closely enough, for Cameron equipped himself on a somewhat lavish scale. His subsequent activities in crossing the continent were hardly marked by any regard for expense; the expedition finally cost over £11,000.

It was when Cameron had reached Tabora that he met the small group of Livingstone's followers bringing their leader's body back to the coast. This was through devotion to his memory no doubt, but also because they did not wish any suspicion about their veracity to arise, well knowing what had been the fate of the Comoro men; "It would go very much against us had we left him," said Carus Parrar.84

In Britain, the Royal Geographical Society arranged Livingstone's impressive funeral and interment in Westminster Abbey while James Young in another act of liberality had Susi and Chuma, two of the faithful bearers, brought to Britain to help Horace Waller edit Livingstone's journals.85 The Royal Geographical Society refused to pay for the funeral but prevailed upon the Treasury to provide the necessary £500. Earlier the Society had persuaded Mr. Gladstone to grant a pension to Livingstone of £300 per annum; this seems to have been agreed to without reference to any Foreign Office scruples about whether their consul was entitled to such a reward. On the news of his death the pension was transferred to the explorer's daughters at a reduced rate of £200 per

81. C. R. Markham in Ocean Highways, 273; Council Minutes, 11 Nov., 26 Nov. 1872, Committee Minutes, 5 Nov., 9 Nov. 1872, RGS.
83. Correspondence Respecting Sir Bartle Frere's Mission, 1873, LXI [C820], 5, 28-30.
85. Fraser, Livingstone, 210-233.
annum. There also seems to have been a grant from the Queen’s Bounty for their education. Recommending the pension for the daughters was the last official action Gladstone took during his 1868-1874 ministry; not to be outdone, Disraeli made one of his first acts the award of a lump sum of £3000 to the Livingstone family. The frequent assumption that the family gained nothing from their father’s work is hardly borne out. 86

All this liberality by no means ended the problems connected with Livingstone’s finances and status. In Zanzibar the unfortunate acting consul, W. F. Prideaux, had to use £902 of his own money to pay off Livingstone’s sixty porters, who were hardly satisfied with special medals sent to them by the Royal Geographical Society. Lord Derby, the new Foreign Secretary, resigned his place on the Royal Geographical Society council rather than admit that the Society now had a claim upon the government for the £902. 87 The officials in the Foreign Office went back to their hard line about Livingstone’s status, insisting he had traveled under the auspices of the Royal Geographical Society. But after complicated negotiations involving alternate badgering of the Foreign Office and the Treasury, the Society persuaded the government to repay Prideaux. However, the government firmly refused to meet any of Cameron’s rapidly rising expenses, despite Royal Geographical Society claims that these, too, had been incurred on Livingstone’s behalf. 88 Once again it was “the apparent state of public feeling” 89 which led to the government’s giving in as far as it did; to the end it refused to acknowledge that Livingstone was a regularly employed servant of the state.

Nevertheless, as far as finance is concerned, to what Livingstone spent out of his own resources the government had added no less that £1500 in grants for the direct purposes of the journey, at least £1200 for expeditions arranged to seek news of him or succor him, £3500 for his funeral and dependants, plus the regular pension of £200 and provision for their education. These sums exclude other expenditures incurred in providing him with free services such as

87. Council Minutes, 22 June, 13 July 1874. RGSA.
88. Council Minutes, 9 March, 15 June 1874, Letter Book, Frere to Northcote, 19 May, 23 May 1874, ibid.; Frere to Derby, 24 March 1874, Bates to Tenterden, 13 Apr. 1874, F.O., 84/1406; Memos, by Lister, Wylde, and Derby on the preceding, F.O. 2/49B. In 1876, however, the government did meet £3000 worth of Cameron’s bills to preserve Britain’s good name.
89. Memo. by Lister on Bates to Tenterden, 13 March 1874, ibid.
his passage from Bombay to Zanzibar. For its part the Royal Geographical Society provided £500 directly and £3229 for relief expeditions (including the part of Cameron's expenses which were directly connected with Livingstone). James Young provided well over £3000 while public subscriptions, mainly for the Dawson expedition, totaled nearly £5000. A good proportion of the latter sum was subscribed by individuals closely connected with the Royal Geographical Society, but the very size of the contributions shows how great a hold the problem of Livingstone had taken over people's minds. And this affected the government -- when it offered support it was simply giving in to the pressure of the patrons of a man who had become one of nineteenth-century Britain's greatest public heroes. Yet this very fact also meant that it was moved into taking a more active part in the campaign against the slave trade. It is undeniable that, although by no means everyone was carried away, the various Foreign Office and Select Parliamentary committees which examined the question were profoundly affected not only by the direct evidence of Livingstone's reports but also by the general fervor he aroused for the abolitionist cause. Hence, the 1873 treaty forced on Zanzibar. There were also increasingly frequent suggestions that Britain should officially intervene in the interior.90

It was, however, in his stimulation of unofficial initiatives by missionaries and philanthropic business men that Livingstone had his greatest impact. This meant, for example, that, because of him, the Nyasa region ultimately did become British rather than Portuguese territory. In the story of increasing European activity in Africa Livingstone is much more than the "hero of the hour"; his influence long survived his death. Moreover, his relationship with the Royal Geographical Society and the government during his last journey illustrates in one particular way that his cause was better recognized at the time than has sometimes been assumed.

90. Hansard, 3rd series, CCVII, 955, 30 June 1871.